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This paper re-examines certain previous conclusions from the classic literature on 
police / media relations in the United Kingdom in the wake of the Filkin and Leveson 
Reports. The paper draws on interviews with senior Metropolitan Police officers, 
press officers and national crime journalists and argues that previous conclusions 
about asymmetrical relations favouring the police are partially problematic, with the 
media being in possession of key resources that often give them the upper hand. The 
paper also explores the role of new media in crime reporting and exposing police 
misconduct and suggests a new transfiguration may be emerging in police / media 
relations, allowing the media partially to by-pass police sources 
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Introduction 
In July 2011, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2011) 
recorded concerns over senior Metropolitan Police officers accepting hospitality from 
senior employees of News International, the parent company of the News of The 
World and other national British newspapers (Mawby 2012). This was followed by 
three separate reviews by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC 2011), 
Elizabeth Filkin (Filkin 2012) and Lord Leveson (Leveson 2012) of the relationship 
between the press and the police. The last of these Reports to be published was the 
Leveson Report in November 2012. Leveson found no extensive evidence of corrupt 
behaviour although the Report was critical of some senior officers’ judgement and 
leadership. The main recommendations of the Report called for more formal reporting 
of contacts between officers and the press, greater consistency of police–press 
policies and practices nationally and ‘clear and direct’ policy guidance – 
recommendations already made by both the HMIC and Filkin Reports. However, as 
the crime correspondent Duncan Campbell suggested, “the big chill on relations 
between the police and journalists had started some months before the Leveson 
Report was completed” (Campbell 2013: 197) with official and unofficial contact 
between the press and the police being severely restricted. Many crime 
correspondents in the United Kingdom argued that these measures severely impeded 
them from carrying out carrying out their Fourth Estate Role, while Mawby (2014) 
expressed concern that these measures “had the potential to reinforce the balance of 
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power uncomfortably towards the police in terms of controlling contacts with the 
press and, hence, the information flow into the public sphere” (Mawby 2014: 242). 
The aim of this paper, five years after the publication of the Leveson and 
Filkin Reports and six years after the publication of the HMIC Report, is to explore 
the current state of play in the relationship between the Metropolitan Police and the 
national news media. This study is based on recent empirical research between 2012 
and 2015. This comprised interviews with senior Metropolitan Police officers, staff 
from the Directorate of Media and Communication at Scotland Yard, both past and 
present, and crime journalists working for national news outlets in online, broadcast 
and print media.  
In order to understand fully the current relationships between the Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS) and the national news media, the study first explores relations 
between the two parties prior to the events of July 2011 and draws on Goffman’s 
(1959) work on front and back region work in order to gain a critical purchase on the 
complex web of relationships, both official and unofficial, that existed between police 
officers, press officers and the media. The paper suggests that, by and large, the 
relationship between the press and the MPS was mutually beneficial and based on 
trust and reciprocity. Nevertheless, from police respondents’ perspectives, the media 
were and are extremely powerful and, in many ways, respondents argued they were 
dependent on the press. Police officers suggested that they felt vulnerable in terms of 
loss of control over content once released to the press, and in the need to make that 
content fit normative news values, and often believed the media held the upper hand.  
The study then examines current relations between the MPS and the national 
news media and suggests that the clampdown on official and unofficial contact has 
led journalists to seek other sources, including social media, for crime news stories. 
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The lack of accountability of online material has on occasion resulted in sensitive 
material being released into the public domain, prejudicing investigations; while 
reporters, unable to access help from press officers in verifying their sources, are 
increasingly printing speculative and inaccurate reports. The study concludes that the 
breakdown in communications between the MPS and the national news media has had 
serious repercussions in terms of operational policing and the integrity of 
investigative reporting in this country. It suggests that the only way forward can be a 
lifting of such restrictions and the rebuilding of relations of trust and reciprocity 
between the MPS and the press. 
 
Police and news media relations in context 
Greer and McLaughlin (2012) argue that one of the key concepts that has 
featured in research on news media and police relationships is Becker’s (1967) 
concept of the “hierarchy of credibility”, a model proposing that, in any society, it is 
taken for granted that governing elites have the power to “define the way things really 
are” (Becker 1967: 140).  
They suggest that this model influenced two key studies in the United 
Kingdom in the 1970s. In Policing The Crisis, Hall et al. (1978) argued that time 
pressures, and the need for media statements wherever possible to be grounded in 
“objective” and “authoritative” statements from “accredited sources”, lead to a 
“systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and 
privileged positions” (Hall et al. 1978: 58). Similarly, Chibnall (1977) suggested that, 
while the police perspective might be challenged on occasion, the relationship 
between the police and the press is always asymmetrical – “the reporter who cannot 
get information is out of a job, whereas the policeman who retains it is not” (Chibnall 
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1977: 155). Subsequent studies in Canada in the late 1980s (Ericson et al. 1987, 1989, 
1991) and in the United Kingdom in the 1990s (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994) took a 
more nuanced view, stressing the importance of economic factors as well as working 
relationships between sources and reporters in shaping the news. However, these 
studies also argued, albeit less deterministically, that the police were the “key 
definitional source in setting the crime agenda” (Greer and McLaughlin 2012: 134). 
In the late 1990s, there was a shift in thinking. Mawby (1999) examined media 
coverage of stories of police corruption and leakage of information by key witnesses 
in the Fred and Rosemary West
1
 murder trials and argued that, far from being able to 
control information for their organisational advantage, police control of the media 
was not as “complete as upholders of the orthodox view would suggest” (Mawby 
1999: 278). Innes (1999) echoed Mawby’s (1999) findings in his study of the ways in 
which police forces in the South of England sought to use the media as an 
investigative resource in murder cases and concluded that “the media is not 
necessarily a functionary of the police institution, it is a diverse industry with its own 
set of guiding principles and objectives” (Innes 1999: 273). 
However, by the end of the 2000s, and immediately prior to the phone hacking 
scandal of 2011, two studies by Cooke and Sturges (2009) and Mawby (2010) 
suggested that the wheel had turned full circle. Both studies suggested that, as a result 
of the rise in police corporate communications, together with organisational changes 
in the news media, including severe staff cuts across the industry, the asymmetric 
police-media relationship identified by Hall et al. (1978) and Chibnall (1977) not only 
                                                        
1
 Fred West, a Gloucestershire builder, was accused of committing 12 murders between 1971 and 1984. 
West committed suicide before his trial but his wife, Rosemary, was convicted of ten murders and 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  
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endures but “has become more pronounced in terms of police dominance of the 
relationship” (Mawby 2010: 1073). 
Since these studies, a number of social, political, cultural and technological 
changes have had an impact on the relationship between the police and the news 
media. Firstly, the relationship between the police and the press has been the subject 
of three major inquiries and reports (HMIC 2011; Filkin 2012; Leveson 2012). One of 
the key recommendations of the Filkin Report was the recording of all contact 
between the police and the press, which was immediately implemented across all 
British police forces, leading Mawby to comment that the balance of police–press 
power is now completely in “favour of the police, who have subsequently used … the 
recommendations for the recording of police–press contacts to further control the flow 
of police news and information” (Mawby 2014: 253). However, as Mawby suggests, 
there has not yet been any empirical research on how these recommendations have 
affected day-to-day relations between the police and the media, and this paper seeks 
to address this. 
The other key change of the last five to seven years has been the increasing 
use of new technologies and social media, both by the police and by the news media. 
There have been two main themes in the research on this subject. In their study of 
news coverage of the riots following the G20 summit meeting in London in 2009, 
Greer and McLaughlin argue that the “capacity of technologically empowered citizen 
journalists to produce information that challenges the official version of events” 
(Greer and McLaughlin 2010: 1041) – in this case, mobile phone footage showing 
that the death of a newspaper vendor, Ian Tomlinson, was due to police brutality – 
means in turn that the role of the police as primary definers and their role in the 
“hierarchy of credibility” can no longer be taken for granted. In a more detailed study 
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of police–news media relations in Australia, Lee and McGovern (2014) endorse this 
finding but also suggest that new technologies may afford the public and the press 
new ways of monitoring the police. They also suggest that new media, such as Twitter 
and Facebook, afford the police ways of communicating with the public more directly 
than through traditional media and allow them more control over content. In the 
current context of restricted relations between police and press in the United 
Kingdom, this study considers whether new media does in fact allow the police to 
bypass traditional media in terms of disseminating information and publicising 
initiatives and further increase their apparent control over “the flow of police news 
and information” (Mawby 2014, p, 273). 
Finally it should be noted that the study concentrates solely on relations 
between the Metropolitan Police Service and the national news media. This is for two 
reasons. Firstly, the focus of all three of the inquiries on police–news media relations 
was on relations between senior MPS officers and the press. Secondly, the economic 
crisis affecting the news industry hit regional papers and outlets hardest (Davies 2008; 
Dean 2011); although, at the time of writing, a leading national newspaper, The 
Independent, had just been closed down, all the national news outlets contacted in the 
course of this study still maintained at least one, and in most cases two or three, 
members of staff involved in crime reporting. Additionally, the Metropolitan Police 
Service’s media relations are more complex than those of other forces for a number of 
reasons: the Metropolitan Police Service’s operational territory is the capital city, a 
focus for national media attention, and it is by far the largest force in England and 
Wales, with national policing responsibilities, such as for counter-terrorism, that 
attract media attention. It cannot be assumed that the issues identified within the 
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Metropolitan Police Service–news media relations are pertinent to other forces 
(Mawby 2012). 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
In order to analyse the complex ebb and flow of relationship and information 
between police sources and crime journalists, this study draws on a model (figure 1 
above) devised by Ericson et al. (1989) based on the work of Goffman (1959) and on 
the subsequent refinements of Giddens (1984: 122-6) and seeks to show how 
organisations such as the police constantly protect and preserve their activities. The 
front regions are where the public business of the police is transacted. Enclosure 
refers to efforts to circumscribe or control information given out to journalists. The 
back regions are where the private work of the organisation is carried out. Disclosure 
relates to efforts to communicate information – through publicity or knowledge 
helpful to their operations or image in the front regions and through what Ericson 
describes as confidence or “leaks” of information which the police would rather not 
make public in the back regions. As the model shows, and as Giddens (1984) points 
out, the differentiation between front and back region by no means coincides with 
enclosure or covering up and disclosure or divulgence and the “two axes operate in a 
complex nexus of possible relations” (1984: 126). In this paper, I draw on this model 
in order to explore the various tactics and strategies press offices and individual 
officers use to control how their organisation and activities are presented in the press; 
and the strategies journalists use to circumvent official channels and official 
narratives to penetrate back region activities and fulfill their Fourth Estate roles. 
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Methods 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with 23 crime correspondents, 
working on national newspapers, of whom 22 were male and one was female. Five 
interviews were carried out with current and former senior employees of the Scotland 
Yard Press Bureau, all of whom were male. Seven interviews were carried out with 
senior Metropolitan Police officers from specialist squads whose work brought them 
into contact on a daily basis with press officers and heads of communication. All of 
these respondents were male. Interviews were initially carried out with crime 
correspondents and access to these journalists was obtained through the author’s 
personal media contacts. A number of crime correspondents offered to introduce the 
author to their own police contacts. Interviews with these contacts then led to personal 
introductions to personnel working within the Scotland Yard Press Bureau. 
The experience of journalists interviewed for this study ranged between eight 
years and over thirty years; similarly, press officers and senior officers interviewed 
for the study had between ten years and over thirty years’ experience. It follows, then, 
that the older participants in this research would have been at the early stages of their 
careers at the time of the early studies of crime news reporting (Chibnall 1977; Hall et 
al. 1978), allowing me to re-evaluate some of the findings in those studies.  
Work began in July 2012 and, whilst the in-depth data gathering had been 
completed by autumn 2013, further follow-up interviews were carried out with two 
journalists and two press officers from Scotland Yard in 2014, to reflect any further 
changes in the police–news media relationship since 2012. This study forms part of a 
larger ethnographic research project on crime news reporting in the United Kingdom 
with the aims of exploring how technological, political, social and economic changes 
have affected relationships between crime, legal and home affairs correspondents and 
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their news sources, their ability to carry out investigative journalism and the effect of 
these changes on the content of crime news in an online, print and broadcast context. 
Interviews were semi-structured and “on the record”. All were tape-recorded, 
apart from one police source, where notes were taken throughout the interview. Each 
interview lasted between 30 minutes and two hours.  
A grounded theory approach was used to thematically code the data following 
transcription. My interviews had taken place at a time when relations between the 
Metropolitan Police and the national media were at a particularly low ebb and I knew 
that my respondents might have a certain agenda in giving me a particular version of 
events, I thus decided to code manually rather than using computer software, 
concerned that software in this instance might lead to an “overemphasis on 
decontextualised instances” (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 156). All questions 
related to the core concerns of this study: (1) to what extent was the relationship 
between the Metropolitan Police Service and the national news media asymmetrical in 
favour of the police? and (2) what effect did the recommendations of the HMIC 
(2011), Filkin (2012) and Leveson (2012) Reports have on current relations between 
the Metropolitan Police Service and the national news media? 
 
Relationships between the Metropolitan Police and the national news media 
prior to July 2011 
Front region activities 
In terms of front region activities, Ericson et al. (1989) argue that the two 
main aims of any news source are to achieve positive publicity while protecting the 
organisation against unwelcome intrusion. At the Metropolitan Police Headquarters at 
Scotland Yard, front region work or work where the official business of the 
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organisation is transacted (Goffman 1959), or in this case publicized, is carried out by 
the Directorate of Media and Communication (formerly the Directorate of Public 
Affairs). The Directorate is the focal point for media contact with the MPS. It works 
to communicate the work of the MPS through four main core activities and four 
branches dealing with this work: news and media relations or the News Branch, 
Internal Communication, E-communication and Marketing and Publicity. The main 
point of contact for crime journalists is the News Branch. This consists of a 24 hour, 
seven day a week bureau, which in 2012-2013 employed three full-time staff and nine 
shift workers. Alongside the press bureau are five specialist desks dedicated to 
supporting the four main functional commands within the MPS: Special Operations, 
Specialist Crime, Central Operations and Territorial Policing; and also the corporate 
desk. These are the main points of contact for requests to interview, or obtain 
information from, senior officers. 
However, for most journalists, the real stories are to be found in the back 
regions of an organisation, areas not usually open to them or other members of the 
public. As Ericson et al. (1989) argue, there is “a great difference between being in a 
position to give coverage to a source organisation’s event, process or state of affairs 
and having access that allows for the story the journalist needs for his news 
organisation’s purposes” (Ericson et al. 1989: 8).  
But it is also important to note that sources such as the Metropolitan Police 
Service and, in this instance, the Directorate of Media and Communication have 
different requirements of enclosure and disclosure of knowledge at different times. 
Police press officers and journalists interviewed for this study suggested that openness 
or otherwise of relations between the Press Bureau and crime journalists varied 
according to successive Commissioners’ policies on official and unofficial contact 
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with the press and to individual Press Officers’ attitudes to their role and relationships 
of trust between those officers and individual reporters. One journalist gave an 
example of this:  
“For years, I’d had this vision of the Met as this impenetrable fortress. But 
when Imbert
2
 took over, he wanted genuinely to know what was wrong. And 
during his time, I wrote a long piece about racial violence and was taken out in 
Southall by the Chief Superintendent, openly saying, “I don’t know how to 
talk to these people and I know that’s a problem for our force”.” 
But he also suggested that access could be stopped or restricted at any time, 
due to a change in Commissioner or a change in Press Bureau personnel. 
“There was a new head of the Press Bureau and I needed access to some 
officers for a story and I called her up and she said, “What’s in it for us?” And 
I realized in that second that the world had changed yet again and the easy 
flow of information I’d had was about to be stopped.” 
Similarly, other journalists suggested that, particularly in the years 
immediately preceding the Leveson Inquiry, information was given to “favourites” of 
press bureau staff rather than the same information being given to all national media 
outlets, resonating with the Filkin Report’s claim that “influence and favour have 
played a part and have affected what should be an unbiased relationship between the 
MPS and the media” (Filkin 2012: 14). 
Although it would seem, then, that control over good and bad news, in terms 
of Press Bureau relations with the national news media from the 1970s to 2000s, 
could be characterised as “contextual, equivocal, transitory and unresolved” (Ericson 
et al. 1989: 8), more recently Mawby (2010; 2012), in a study of relations between 
                                                        
2
 Sir Peter Imbert was Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police from 1987 to 1983.  
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regional police press offices and crime journalists working for regional outlets, has 
suggested that a number of factors have led to the balance of power being asymmetric 
in favour of the police. In particular, the introduction of twenty-four hours rolling 
news, coupled with staff cuts across the news media industry and the need to fill more 
space with fewer staff, has, according to Mawby (2010; 2012), led to a greater 
dependence by journalists on police-produced press releases and other promotional 
material.  
However, as Ericson et al. (1989) comment, police experience the strictures of 
news discourse just as reporters are limited by police discourse, and police–media 
relations inevitably entail controls from both sides and inter-dependency. Certainly it 
could be said that, in terms of preparing the initial press release, sources have always 
functioned as reporters – constantly deciding whether certain information should be 
released and which details should be kept back. Nevertheless, the police respondents 
in this study, while acknowledging that they “controlled the primary definitions of the 
subject of address (crime, criminality and control by the police)” (Ericson et al. 1989: 
124), believed themselves to be quite dependent on journalists in the process of co-
operation with them. Firstly, press officers argued that journalists could take a snippet 
from an interview and place it with others to give it a context of their own making. 
Secondly, police officers and press officers argued that, in terms of using the media to 
publicise details of an investigation or to appeal for help from the public, the media 
would only run stories if they met normative news values and appealed to the 
particular demographic of a news outlet (Chibnall 1977; Jewkes 2004). As one press 
officer explained:  
“There’s a borough called Southwark and in the Met it’s called M district. 
And that became M for murder.  You get a little old lady who just happened to 
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be mugged in Brixton. And fallen, broke her arm and then died of pneumonia. 
That’s a murder inquiry. But stories about little old ladies aren’t seen as sexy 
or interesting. Whereas there was a case of a girl who was an ex-Playboy 
model who was found murdered in the East End. Beautiful young girl, element 
of sleaze, found murdered. So that story ran and ran.” 
Chibnall (1977) identifies a number of core news values or imperatives, which 
act as an implicit guide to the construction of news stories, including dramatisation, 
personalisation and immediacy. Jewkes (2004) updates this list, suggesting that a 
number of other news values also now determine an editor’s perception of whether a 
story will appeal to his or her outlet’s audience. These include stories that feature 
children as victims or offenders, stories with a celebrity angle, stories featuring crimes 
of a particularly violent or sexual nature, and stories featuring crimes with a strong 
element of spectacle, such as arson, rioting or police clashes with citizens. She also 
identifies proximity, both spatial and cultural, as a key new news value. Spatial 
proximity relates to the geographical nearness of an event while cultural proximity 
relates to the “relevance” of an event or crime to an audience or readership. For 
example, she suggests that the likelihood of the national news media lending its 
weight to a campaign to find a missing person is far higher if that missing person is a 
child or a young woman who is white, middle-class and of British descent. By 
contrast, if a missing person or victim of a crime is older, as in the example above, of 
African-Caribbean or Asian descent, is working-class or has had previous 
convictions, Jewkes argues that “reporters perceive that their audience is less likely to 
relate or empathise with the victim, and the case gets commensurably lower publicity” 
(Jewkes 2004: 57). Thus, in order to access media assistance with certain 
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investigations, police sources know that they need to have an understanding of 
newsworthiness and that not all cases will fit those criteria (Fenton 2009). 
Secondly, police sources, both press officers and individual officers, suggested 
that reporters often operate with the assumption that “something hidden is going on” 
(Ericson et al. 1989: 126). However, as one senior officer explained, the predominant 
reason for secrecy is that disclosure of information might prejudice an investigation in 
progress by affecting the production and later value of evidence. Police officers also 
face the dilemma that disclosure may allow them to portray their work or the 
organisation in a better light, but enclosure is essential in the circumstances or is a 
legal requirement. 
One police source described the pressure he had felt from the Press Bureau to 
give details to the press of the arrest of a serial rapist who had attacked a number of 
elderly victims, even though such information would prejudice his investigation. 
“I know x (Press Officer) wanted us to get in first to manage the reputation of 
the organisation, which was going to take a battering, because it had taken us 
twelve years to catch him. But we needed to make sure that the inevitable 
mass of public speculation didn’t interfere with the fairness of his trial. And 
there was a big tension between protecting the integrity of the investigation 
versus the reputation of the organisation.” 
Other reasons given for maintaining secrecy about back region work included 
sensitivity to the impact of publicity on citizens involved in a particular case, and not 
giving “the criminal element” information that might be to their benefit. However, at 
the same time, officers – and press officers – realised that if they remained secretive 
about back-region activities, they ran the risk – especially in an increasingly 
competitive media culture with huge pressure put daily on journalists to fill space 
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(Davies 2008) – that, as one respondent suggested, reporters would “either dig things 
up by themselves and print them or make them up”. One tactic (Chibnall 1977; 
Ericson et al. 1989; Schlesinger and Tumber 1994) used by heads of specialist desks, 
such as Counter-Terrorism, was to take the news media into their confidence and ask 
them to postpone the publication of certain information: 
“The one I refer to particularly is post 9/11, where the accusation at the time 
was that we were exaggerating the terrorist threat, in order to support British 
foreign policy in Iraq. We had a lot of terrorist cases in the pipeline where the 
evidence would eventually come out but we couldn’t tell the public yet what 
we’d found. So there was a clear public interest in informing editors, we’ve 
found plans for dirty bombs so that they didn’t then rush off writing things 
which were wrong ... which would undermine our ability to mount effective 
investigations.” 
Although the dominant view in the literature in the 1970s, and again in this 
decade, is that the police–journalist relationship in the United Kingdom is 
asymmetrical in favour of the police, all police respondents in this study felt quite 
dependent on journalists and that, whatever partial control they had over information, 
journalists had the power to edit and the power of the last word. 
 
Back region activities 
For any bureaucratic organisation with hundreds of departments and thousands 
of employees, control of knowledge is always partial. The effort to control such 
information is a perpetual struggle and, as Ericson et al. comment, although “the 
police devise various formal–organisation appearances that they are in command … 
fundamental control remains elusive” (Ericson et al. 1989: 12). They go on to 
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comment that the work of an organisation, in this case, police–media relations, “does 
not get done simply in terms of where the parties are supposed to connect on the 
organizational charts” but is “accomplished through a complex web of relations, 
affinities, trust and reciprocity” (Ericson et al. 1989: 129). 
One of the key ways in which journalists attempt to circumvent the 
gatekeeping role of police–public relations is to establish their own police contacts 
and sources (Chibnall 1977; Ericson et al. 1989, 1991; Schlesinger and Tumber 1994; 
Mawby 2010, 2012; Lee and McGovern 2014). In her witness statement to the 
Leveson Inquiry, the British crime reporter Sandra Laville gave her reasons for 
seeking to circumvent “official” channels of information: 
“The Met is very bad at answering questions when things have gone wrong or 
at giving out information on incompetent investigations that affect the public 
or have put the public at risk … As such I have always sought and built 
contacts with police officers, whose desire is to keep an open flow of 
information in order to highlight abuses of power, to highlight the brilliant 
work of a team member … to correct any mistakes I might be about to make.” 
(Laville 2012b: 3) 
For many crime journalists, having informal links to the police is invaluable in 
the search for an exclusive story in an increasingly competitive market (Fenton 2009). 
As one respondent commented, “If you just relied on the Press Bureau, all you’d get 
is the party line. You need to talk to people on the job, who are out there on the front 
line, who know what’s really happening.” Such relationships would often be built 
over a number of years and “would operate as structured allegiances that can be seen 
as competing and/or operating in tandem with official channels of information” (Lee 
and McGovern 2014: 195). Additionally, such relationships could often bring benefits 
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to both parties, as one crime journalist describes working on the case of Carole 
Waugh, a middle-aged woman, whose body was found three months after her 
mysterious disappearance in a garage in Surrey in 2012. 
“So I rang my detective to ask him if it was true what my ring-in had said, that 
she was not a millionaire businesswoman which is how we’d all been 
reporting, but that she was actually a high class escort. So first of all, he said 
he couldn’t answer, then about an hour later he rang back, said he’d spoken to 
the family and yes, that was an avenue of inquiry that she was an escort and 
would it be possible as a tip-off back to ring my guy.” 
But as Lee and McGovern suggest in their study of Australian police–news 
media relations, journalists are not the only ones who “actively resist attempts to 
govern their activities” (Lee and McGovern 2014: 195) and among the key concerns 
of both the Filkin and Leveson Reports (2012) were the ways in which police officers 
at all levels, for a wide range of reasons, also seek to circumvent official channels of 
information, by revealing “back-region” secrets to the press (Filkin Report 2012; Lee 
and McGovern 2014). 
When asked why they thought colleagues often gave unauthorised information 
to the press, police respondents suggested that it was for a variety of reasons and 
would vary according to the rank of the officer and the nature of the interaction he or 
she would have with the press (Filkin 2012). Some suggested that, at street level, 
officers might leak information to the press “for a sense of importance, getting one 
over on their colleagues, a bit of self-aggrandisement”. Others suggested that 
ambition was a motivating factor at street level and above. But a key problem at all 
levels were “leaks” to reporters on special police operations. One police respondent 
described how he had endeavoured to keep secret the impending arrests of the four 
LEVESON FIVE YEARS ON  18 
 
men involved in the attempted London bombing on 21 July 2005, to the extent that he 
had not even given the operational details to the Directorate of Media and 
Communication, “simply because you put anyone who has that information in an 
awkward position if there is a problem”. However, as he recounted, the information 
was leaked to a television reporter: 
“who was standing outside Parliament the day the arrests were made. Could 
have been the Met. Could have even have been inside Number Ten. Could 
have been both. But what I do know is the organisation is a sieve.” 
Media respondents also spoke of access to systematic sources of police 
information and that contacts would run criminal information checks for them. One 
journalist spoke of a deal he had made with a senior officer who, knowing that the 
journalist was about to run a potentially sensitive story on him, offered “information 
on another colleague’s investigation to get me off his back”.  
Goffman (1959) argues that there are a number of types of secret that may be 
disclosed about an organisation’s back regions, the types being “based upon the 
function the secret performs and the relation of the secret to the conception others 
have about the possessor” (Goffman 1959: 141). One such type is the “dark” secret – 
facts about a team or organisation “which it knows and conceals and which are 
incompatible with the image of self that the team attempts to maintain before its 
audience” (Goffman 1959: 141). Leaks about police corruption, malpractice and/or 
incompetent investigations affecting the public or putting the public at risk fall into 
this category, and many journalists recounted how several major stories about police 
corruption and police malpractice had come to them from insider police contacts. The 
crime correspondent Sandra Laville, echoing these findings, commented in an article 
in The Guardian: 
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“Within the Met, the Guardian knows of at least two cases where 
whistleblowers have been bullied, isolated and investigated for spurious 
disciplinary offences which have never been proven, after making complaints 
to superior officers about bad practice, including racism and sexual assault.” 
(Laville 2012a) 
For that reason, as one interviewee explained, rather than making complaints 
through official channels, whistle-blowers in the police organisation have preferred to 
make contact anonymously with journalists.  
Finally, as the Leveson Inquiry noted, “sometimes the motive for approaching 
the press is little other than personal disgruntlement or the desire to wound 
colleagues” (Leveson 2012: 987). In his study of police–media relations, Silverman 
(2012) argues that, particularly for senior officers, the media provides valuable 
resources in terms of forging reputations or fighting personality battles. Goffman 
(1959) categorises this as the “strategic” secret – a secret to be released in order to 
“disrupt the performance” of the organisation. A respondent interviewed for this study 
gave an example of this. He was given in confidence a story about a senior police 
officer’s sexual indiscretion by one of the officer’s colleagues. However, as the 
journalist explained, the motive for divulging this secret was not merely to discredit a 
colleague but to bring about, by using leverage of adverse publicity in the press, the 
officer in question’s resignation. As the respondent explained:  
“I thought long and hard, was this in the public interest? So I was taking 
soundings from other senior police officers who were independent, who didn’t 
have an axe to grind against that man. And I came to the conclusion that it had 
to be. He was a senior officer who came within a whisker of losing his job 
over a high profile murder case. Who had exercised poor judgement. And had 
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gone on holiday in the first twenty-four hours of a major investigation, two 
missing girls…If he’d had a clean slate, so to speak, beforehand ... then I 
might, I might not have done it.” 
If control over knowledge in any large organisation can only ever be partial, 
the easiest way, as Ericson et al. (1989) argue, for the police to overcome “the ways 
in which they lose power in their relationship with reporters is to develop a spatial, 
social and cultural system of relations that maintains a spirit of trust and reciprocity” 
(Ericson et al. 1989: 126). In the next section, the study explores how the 
recommendations of the Filkin and Leveson Reports on police–media relations were 
implemented by the Metropolitan Police Service and laid waste any relations of trust 
and reciprocity between the MPS and the national press that had previously existed. 
 
The big chill? The balance of power between the Metropolitan Police Service and 
the national news media, post July 2011 
Closure of front and back region access 
In July 2011, employees of News International were accused of phone hacking 
and police bribery. This was followed by Operations Elveden (investigating 
allegations of inappropriate payments to police officers) and Weeting (investigating 
allegations of phone hacking) and reviews by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of 
Constabulary (HMIC, 2011), Elizabeth Filkin (Filkin 2012) and Lord Leveson 
(Leveson 2012) of the relationship between the press and the police.  
The concerns raised by these reports revolved round a number of issues: that 
some senior police officers had become too close to senior media personnel, that 
hospitality was out of control (Mawby 2012) and that information had been leaked to 
media outlets for various reasons. However, while the HMIC Report (2011) suggested 
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that a record of all meetings between police officers and press contacts should be 
made, the Filkin Report (2012) was more proscriptive and suggested that all police 
officers should make notes of information supplied to the press with such records 
being freely available to their line manager (Filkin 2012: 44).  
Despite all Reports highlighting the importance of the media’s public function 
and explicitly warning against a disproportionate response to their findings (Filkin 
2012: 7; Leveson 2012: 20), respondents in this study indicate that the initial response 
by Scotland Yard and by the Directorate of Media and Communication was a severe 
limitation on official requests for interviews and information on ongoing 
investigations and a clampdown on unofficial contact with the press, with officers 
being threatened with disciplinary proceedings in the event of any unauthorised 
disclosures being made to the press. As one journalist explained: 
“I went to a briefing today on the Sapphire Rape Unit. Now this is open 
knowledge that the Unit is in crisis but today we were all given these success figures 
about rape and I knew that they were glossing over the big issue – that the Unit is in 
serious trouble. But I can’t do anything without officers in Sapphire to talk to me. 
And we know there’s a problem but we can’t report it. It’s bad for the public, bad for 
democracy and bad for the police.” 
These recommendations came at a time when police–news media relations 
were being transformed globally by the increasing use of social media such as 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Flickr by the police to disseminate information 
about initiatives, to appeal for help with investigations and to promote police work 
(Lee and McGovern 2014). In the last fifteen years, as Lee and McGovern (2014) 
observe, not only has the Internet “grown to become one of the most powerful tools in 
the police’s media and public relations toolbox” but police organisations globally 
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have made “strategising round social media … a priority within media and public 
affairs branches of police organisations” (Lee and McGovern 2014). In his witness 
report to the Leveson Inquiry in 2012, Dick Fedorcio, a former Director of Media and 
Communication at Scotland Yard, gave examples of how the MPS used social media 
to publicise front region activities (Goffman 1959). These included regular webchats 
between the Commissioner and Londoners and posting photos during the riots in 
London in August 2011 of wanted suspects on Flickr, a website designed specifically 
for photo sharing. Police respondents in this study also described how social media 
allowed them to reach new audiences when publicising new initiatives, with one 
explaining that “If we want to publicise a knife crime operation, seventeen to twenty 
one year olds aren’t going to read The Guardian. But they are going to look on 
Facebook”. The same respondent also argued that, by using social media, the 
Metropolitan Police Service could also publicise stories that would not be deemed 
newsworthy by the national press (Chibnall 1977; Jewkes 2004; Dean 2011). 
“We put out a story about two officers going into a burning building and 
saving a family, putting their lives at risk. Got a little bit on the local TV news, 
nothing in the Evening Standard. But when we put it on our social media 
channel, that got a massive reaction.” 
Although there have been a limited number of criminological studies on the 
effect of new and social media on police–news media relations (Greer and 
McLaughlin 2010; Mawby 2010; Goldsmith 2010, 2015; Lee and McGovern 2014), 
the ways in which new media have reconfigured traditional source–media dynamics 
have been widely explored in a cultural studies context (Fenton 2009; Davis 2007; 
Couldry 2009). In a study of NGOs and their use of new media, Fenton (2009) argues 
that, in increasingly competitive news markets, NGOs can follow one of two routes – 
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produce copy that conforms to normative news values or follow the path initiated by 
grassroots pressure groups, as she terms them, groups “that reject wholesale any 
relationship with mainstream media on the grounds that they will distort and 
misrepresent their views and use new media for the dissemination of alternative news 
and views” (Fenton 2009: 196). In the same vein, press officers from the MPS argued 
that new and particularly social media allowed them the chance to communicate more 
directly with their public than ever before and to have more control – at least in initial 
dissemination – over the content of material released than was the case when dealing 
with traditional media. 
Given the restrictions on official and unofficial contact with the press and 
consequent closure of access to both front and back region activities of the MPS, 
coupled with the use of new media as a way of bypassing traditional news media to 
disseminate information and gain positive publicity, Mawby’s (2010) observation that 
the balance of power in terms of the police–news media relationship would seem to 
be asymmetrically in favour of the police might be seen to be prescient.  
However, while the use of social media and new technologies may have 
enabled the police to communicate more directly with the public than ever before in 
disseminating front region activities, Lee and McGovern (2014) suggest that: 
“The very same technologies and forums police are employing have also 
provided the public with more sophisticated ways in which to monitor the 
police and publicly disseminate and circulate images and narratives that 
potentially counter those coming from the police.” (Lee and McGovern 2014: 
174) 
Lee and McGovern (2014) argue that the beating of African-American 
construction worker Rodney King in 1991 by officers from the Los Angeles Police 
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Department, captured on film by a bystander observing from his flat, “constituted a 
watershed moment in the capacity for citizen countersurveillance” (Lee and 
McGovern 2014: 179.) But, as they also observe, the timing was felicitous – what has 
changed between 1991 and the present day is the ubiquity of smartphones allowing 
citizens to record police malpractice and to upload content almost instantaneously 
onto social media sites. Greer and McLaughlin (2010) argue that, in terms of the 
police–news media relationship, one of the critical developments of the last few years 
has been that of the citizen journalist, a term defined by Allan and Thorsen (2009) as 
“the spontaneous actions of ordinary people, caught up in extraordinary events, who 
felt compelled to adopt the role of a news reporter”. They discuss how press coverage 
of the G20 riots in 2009 and the death of a newspaper vendor called Ian Tomlinson 
changed as a result of the emergence of mobile phone footage showing Ian Tomlinson 
being beaten by a police officer with a baton. As Greer and McLaughlin (2010) argue, 
citizen journalism has not only provided “a valuable additional source of real-time 
information” but also helped to challenge “the ‘official truth’, as portrayed by those 
powerful institutional sources who have traditionally maintained a relatively 
uncontested position at the top of the ‘hierarchy of credibility’” (Greer and 
McLaughlin 2010: 1056). 
But social media also pose another difficulty for the police. As Fenton (2009) 
argues, although early commentators on the advent of the internet and its impact on 
journalistic practices eulogised its “democratic potential, its ability to become a tool 
for the people wresting power from the elite structures of society” (Fenton 2009: 4), 
later researchers commented on “how the lack of accountability and anonymity of 
those responding online also introduces concerns of verification, accountability and 
accuracy”. These concerns were echoed by many police respondents, who suggested 
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that the advent of new media coupled with the deterioration of relations between the 
Metropolitan Police Service and the national news media could have grave 
consequences – not only in terms of inaccurate, speculative reports, based on 
information from members of the public posting on Twitter, but could also on 
occasion causing distress to victims’ families or prejudicing judicial proceedings by 
releasing the names of suspects into the public domain too soon. One respondent cited 
an example: 
“My colleagues have had this with the Jimmy Savile3 case where there are one 
or two celebrities were being investigated but obviously we didn’t give their 
identities to the press, but their identities circulated on social media. And that 
has a massive impact on the victims’ families as they want to know if this is 
true, and where this information is coming from.” 
Additionally, police respondents involved in frontline activities – heads of 
specialist units or murder detectives, in the case of this study – expressed concern that 
the breakdown in relations with the national press, forcing journalists to find other 
sources for stories, including social media, would lead to more and more inaccurate 
reporting of cases, possibly with serious consequences for the Metropolitan Police 
Service. As one police respondent explained: 
“The press seem to think that the big problem in this clampdown on contact is 
that they won’t be able to carry out their Fourth Estate Role but the fact is the 
real problem for both sides is the fact that without contact, without that trust, 
things are going to be put in the public domain that are not in the public 
                                                        
3
 Jimmy Savile was an English DJ, television and radio personality, dance hall manager, and charity 
fundraiser. After his death, hundreds of allegations of sexual abuse were made against him, leading the 
police to believe that Savile was a predatory sex offender – possibly one of Britain's most prolific. 
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interest, that are going to damage police operations and are going to damage 
press credibility if they put out information they can’t back up.” 
But in a fast-moving, highly competitive media environment, the pressure is 
on journalists to fill space and break news, with or without police co-operation. One 
seasoned crime reporter described how he tried to access information about the 
shooting of Mark Duggan
4
, whose killing by Metropolitan Police officers in North 
London was the trigger for the nationwide riots in the United Kingdom in 2011. 
“On the Friday morning, there was a news agency report that Duggan had 
been dragged from his car and shot in the head by police officers. So your 
immediate reaction is that it can’t be right, but you can’t ignore it. So I put it 
to a lot of people and all I got was no comment. Whereas in the past, they 
would have given you a steer, like they didn’t think that was right, or a bit of 
background but with the big freeze there was nothing. So we couldn’t take the 
chance of not printing it – by then there was all manner of things on social 
media, and if we didn’t run it, the others would, so we went ahead but with the 
caveat that a witness had claimed they’d seen this, to clear us from the risk of 
prosecution.” 
Yet, as one press officer explained, in a climate in which colleagues had been 
investigated for having a coffee with a press contact, using discretion to decide what 
could or could not be given as background to a journalist was a luxury they could no 
longer afford. In the same vein, the more seasoned crime journalists understood the 
reason for reticence on the part of former contacts within the MPS, both within the 
                                                        
4
 Mark Duggan, a 29-year-old Tottenham resident, was shot and killed by police in Tottenham, North 
London, England, on 4 August 2011. The Metropolitan Police stated that officers were attempting to 
arrest Duggan on suspicion of planning an attack, and that he was in possession of a handgun. 
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Press Bureau and within the wider organisation, but nevertheless argued that if the 
MPS refused to comment or assist with press enquiries, they still had a “job to do, a 
paper to fill”. One respondent explained that his tactic post-Leveson was “to call the 
Press Bureau, send a mail, say okay, here’s the story I am going to write, do you have 
any comments? And if they don’t, then it’s on their heads if we don’t get it right.” 
As Ericson et al. 1989 argue, “a source organisation that is expected to engage 
the public conversation and fails to do so, sews the seeds of long-term hostile 
relations with journalists” (Ericson et al. 1989: 381). Currently, the relationship 
between the MPS and the national news media would seem to be in such a parlous 
state. While police officers and press officers alike welcomed what they hoped would 
be a decrease in leaks to the press, through restrictions on unofficial contact, they also 
acknowledged that, by their silence, they also relinquished any control they might 
have had over accounts of crimes and ongoing investigations printed in the press. As 
one respondent said: 
“By monitoring every interaction, I think we (the Metropolitan Police Service) 
believe we have won the battle. We’ve lost. And I think instead of us 
controlling negative publicity, we’re actually going to see more and more of it 
as a result of the lack of trust and the culture of fear we’ve set up in the 
organisation and in our relations with the media. And that is also going to 
affect the public and their perception of us as an organisation.” 
While new media may seem to have enabled the police to bypass the 
traditional news media, new media technologies and platforms are “also being 
deployed to promote and produce counter-discourse and resistances to preferred 
police messages” (Lee and McGovern 2014). At the same time, restricted contact 
between the MPS and the national news media has forced crime journalists to seek 
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out alternative sources for stories, including social media, but lack of accountability 
over the content of such media, coupled with press officers’ increasing fear of dealing 
with the press, has led to increasingly inaccurate reporting, compromising 




This paper has set out to explore relations between the MPS and the national 
news media, both prior to and following the Leveson and Filkin Reports on the ethics 
of the relationship between the police as an organisation and the news media. The 
study suggests that prior to the events of July 2011, which precipitated the 
commissioning of these two Reports, the relationship was complex, multilayered and 
contingent – that openness to both front and back region activities of the MPS 
revolved round a number of factors, both social and cultural, including the policy of 
the then Commissioner towards press relations, the personality of the Commissioner 
in question, the agenda of individual press officers in terms of dealing with the press 
and individual relationships formed between press officers, individual police officers 
and members of the national news media. Although previous academic literature has 
either suggested a relationship between the two parties in which the police are the 
dominant party or a more symbiotic relationship in which both parties have a 
mutually beneficial relationship, police respondents in this study argued that they 
often felt vulnerable in their relationships with the press. While they might be the 
“primary definers of crime and its control to the public” (Ericson et al. 1989: 123), 
police and press officers argued that, prior to July 2011, they often “sensed a loss of 
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control over specific terms of the communication” (Ericson et al., 1989: 124) and that 
they frequently believed the media held the upper hand. 
Although, in the wake of recommendations by the Leveson and Filkin Reports 
(2012) that all police contact with the press should be recorded, commentators 
(Laville 2012; Campbell 2013; Mawby 2014) have expressed concern that the balance 
of police–press power has swung firmly towards the police, this paper suggests that 
the current police–press relationship is somewhat more complex. It might seem that 
the police are more in control than ever before of the flow of information and police 
news to the press, and that the advent of social media has further strengthened their 
position, by enabling them to communicate more directly with the public than ever 
before and by affording them complete control over the information released (Lee and 
McGovern 2014). 
However, as a result of restrictions on contact with the press, journalists have 
been forced to seek other news stories, including stories accessed through social 
media. The lack of accountability for material posted online, coupled with Scotland 
Yard press officers’ reluctance to engage with the press beyond their very limited 
remit, has led to increasingly inaccurate and, at times, inflammatory reporting, 
sometimes with serious consequences for operational policing. 
But more than that, the restrictions imposed on contact between the police and 
the press has serious implications for democratic practices in this country. As Lord 
Leveson argued in the Leveson Inquiry (2012): 
“In our mature democracy policing must be with the consent of the public … 
The public must be kept aware of policing concerns and must engage in the 
debate. Therefore the press has a vital role: it must encourage the public to 
engage in the criminal justice system by coming forward with evidence and it 
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must applaud when criminals are brought to justice as a result. The press must 
also hold the police to account, acting as the eyes and ears of the public.” 
(Leveson 2012:20) 
In the current climate, the public are not being kept aware of policing 
concerns. Journalists are aware that when official briefings on MPS work are held, 
they are only being given part of the story or an overly favourable impression of 
police work, as in the case of the reporter discussing the briefing on the Sapphire 
Rape Unit’s work; but without informal contacts to corroborate their concerns, they 
are unable to voice their fears in the press. Inaccurate information is being printed in 
the press because police press officers are worried about overstepping their brief and 
giving too much information to journalists.  And while in the past, many abuses of 
police power or corruption were brought to the attention of the press by serving 
officers, this channel has now seemingly been closed. If, as Schlesinger and Tumber 
(1994) argue, “openness and publicity are means of making political life transparent 
and accountable” (Schlesinger and Tumber 1994:8), the current climate of censorship 
and control dominating the police – press relationship must surely work in a contrary 
direction. 
While both police and press respondents acknowledged that relations between 
some police officers, particularly in the MPS, and some members of the news media 
had been problematical, both sides believed, as one police respondent put it, “that the 
police have over-reacted. What was needed was a sticking plaster and instead they 
have put a bloody great cast on the problem”. However, Reiss (1984) suggests that, 
given the larger an organisation is, the more vulnerable it is to disclosure of its 
secrets, the best way to police such knowledge is not by deterrence, but by combining 
“control with compliance, surveillance with trust” (Reiss 1984: 29). In the case of 
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police–media relations prior to July 2011, this study argues that a relationship of trust 
and reciprocity did exist between a significant number of MPS officers, press officers 
and members of the national press, a relationship in which journalists, by and large, 
were trusted to maintain “secrecy and confidence when it count[ed]” and with 
“having the good sense ... not to publicise something when it might affect the 
organisation negatively” (Ericson et al. 1989: 381). It is clear for many reasons – the 
legitimacy of policing, the ability of the public to assess and understand the conduct 
of policing, the integrity of crime news reporting and the integrity of operational 
police work – that a relationship of trust and reciprocity needs to be rebuilt between 
the police and press, even if such trust and reciprocity may be as “elusive as the 
control of knowledge itself” (Ericson et al. 1989: 382). 
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